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The New Slavery, or Chrysalization of Class
The negro slaves of the South are the happiest, and, in some sense, the freest people in
the world…They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care nor labor.1
— George Fitzhugh, 1857
This paper shows that emergence of modern childhood can be explained by a need to secure unpaid labor
of school-aged children by means of extra-economic coercion. The pre-modern Europe needed to compel a
growing segment of population to participate in unpaid work of schooling. The task was accomplished by
creating a group with limited rights, and by convincing everyone that the labor of schooling is actually a
kind of service provided to children. Ultimately, the modern conception of childhood was born of power
relations formed by economic necessity. To support the claim, I rely mainly on Philippe Ariès’s account.
Michel Foucault and Karl Marx provided ways of thinking about mechanics of power.

Ariès and his thesis
Before we can proceed, a disclaimer on Ariès: the main thesis of his Centuries of Childhood is overstated.
“No doubt, —writes Ariès,—the discovery of childhood began in the thirteenth century, and its progress
has can be traced in history of art in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.”2 The “no doubt” clause usually
appears in weaker arguments. It is very unlikely that after the collapse of Antiquity Europeans have
forgotten what children are. Of all available ethnographic data, age grouping is probably the most
commonly cited phenomenon; why European societies should be an exception? Some of Ariès’s evidence
is dubious, too. For example, he thinks that medieval artists failed to perceive distinct physical features of
children, and depicted them as smaller adults. This, of course, can be better explained with period-specific
aesthetic ideals than with failure to perceive children as different from adults. Linda Pollock undertook
careful analysis of Ariès and other historians who share the conviction that childhood did not exist before
the 17th century. She finds that actual practices of child rearing changed very little between 16th and 19th
centuries, and that Ariès’ sources and methods are suspect.3 Yet Ariès is not a historian in the traditional
sense; rather, he is a thinker like Foucault, if of a smaller caliber. His analytic descriptions overshadow his
conclusions.
Here is how to save Ariès’ thesis from its author. Almost any way of grouping people may or may not be
used in power relations. Such things as race or ethnicity, or religion can fluctuate from being relatively
unimportant, to taking a central stage in power matters. Other distinctions such as gender, are always
important, but can be used differently to project power. Some differences do have biological basis (gender,
race, possibly sexual orientation), while others are completely culturally based (caste, lineage, religion,
ethnicity, class). In the former case, people can always tell the difference between, a man and a woman, or
dark skin versus light skin, but making those distinctions significant is a feature of a given society’s power
technology. Childhood is one of such categories, loosely based on biology, but utilized in a specific form of
a power relationship. Europeans, like all humans, have always known that children are developmentally
different from adults. What Ariès describes is a reinvention rather than an invention of childhood.

Reinvention of childhood
Although Ariès does not explain why childhood needed reinventing, he demonstrates several means by
which childhood was redefined in the European societies at the end of the Middle Ages. Among these
means are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Distinctive dress; segregation from adults in play and work;
Exaggeration of children’s immaturity;
The idea of childhood innocence that needs to be preserved;
Linking schooling to biological age;

5.
6.

Stripping students of political self-governance and withdrawal of many previously existing rights;
Corporal punishment and intrusive supervision.

History of childhood resembles formation of subjugated groups, such as lower classes, women, the nonEuropean races, etc. The same legal and cultural mechanisms, same rhetorical techniques, same ideological
moves were employed. Moreover, children were systematically linked to and compared with such groups
already subjugated.
Ariès traces the appearance of a special uniform to set children aside from adults. “Every social nuance had
its corresponding sign in clothing. At the end of the sixteenth century, custom dictated that childhood,
henceforth recognized as a separate entity, should also have its special costume.” Ariès notes that “boys
were the first specialized children;”4 their dress was made distinct much sooner, perhaps because boys
began going to school in large numbers in the late sixteenth century. Three elements separated a middle
class boy’s dress from that of an adult: it was archaic, effeminized, and reminiscent of lower classes. The
symbolism here is quite clear. Children were symbolically linked to the old, backwards times, and to old,
feeble people. Boys were made look like girls, a reference to another dominated group. Finally, the link to
the lower class invoked imagery of subordination. Sailor’s suites, short pants, militaristic uniforms —all of
these invited patterns of subordination to not just adult authority, but authority of adult institutions such as
school. Interestingly, the children’s dress fashions did not penetrate the lower classes: “They kept up the
old way of life which made no distinction between children and adults, in dress or in work or in play.”5
This happened because lower class kids did not go to school, so there was no need to subjugate them
beyond already available class and social status domination.
In the middle of the fifteenth century, certain aristocrats had funded houses (colleges) at the University of
Paris for poor students. Soon after, well-to-do families started to send their own offspring to the colleges,
because of their stricter discipline. Ariès comments:
“Thus with the institution of the college appeared a feeling unknown to the Middle Ages and
which would grow in strength until the end of the nineteenth century: revulsion at the idea of
mingling of the ages. Henceforth schoolboys would tend to be separated from adults and
submitted to a discipline peculiar to their position, for the good reputation of the poor scholars was
chiefly due to their ‘confinement’ (réclusion).”6
Now, confinement and strict discipline served one main purpose; to make the boys study harder. Efficiency
gains in school labor come from stricter discipline, which in turn, means shortening of free time, and
increase of on-task time. This is still the main way to gain productivity of school learning; it is not better
teaching methods or better curriculum. The latter has to do with the specifics of learning: unlike any other
labor, its efficiency is directly linked to effort, and such labor cannot be significantly automated or divided.
The link to biological age is a successful attempt to confine the labor of schooling to a specific, easily
identifiable group. Just as racial slavery is a more efficient way of domination, equating childhood with
studenthood uses a preexisting marker to define a newly conceptualized group.
Next, introduction of a simple assumption that children are not supposed to have sexual desire or violent
impulses, creates a whole class of young deviants, and helps keeping the rest of children in check. Ariès
writes (approvingly, I must note) that towards the end of the sixteenth century, “certain pedagogues …
refused to allow children to be given indecent books any longer. The idea originated of providing
expurgated editions of the classics for the use of children. This was a very important stage, which maybe
regarded as marking the beginning of respect for childhood.”7 This passage shows Ariès’ belief that all the
changes in the status of childhood he believes to be ultimately positive, liberating children from indecency
and delivering them to the arms of educators. Women constitute another class whose submission was
assured by the presumption of innocence. If women and children as groups are by nature asexual and
peaceful, then one has to make sure each individual child and woman are made to comply with their
“nature” by any means necessary. The idea of keeping children ignorant of sexual matters is a sophisticated
way of control. If we assume that children are not supposed to have sexual (or any other bodily) desires,
any manifestations of such will serve as evidence of their corruption, and therefore justify their dependency
on adult authority. The same line of reasoning was later extended to older children, when G. Stanley Hall
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invented the notion of adolescence.8 The obsession with youth sexuality is stronger now than ever before:
various abstinence movements, sex education, teacher-student sex scandals; all drive home the same point:
young people need supervision, because otherwise they might develop wrong desires. And if their desires
look exactly like ours, well, they are young and therefore must not have those desires. Of course, the adult
desire itself have been shaped, as Foucault has shown, and the denial of children’s desire was a part of the
larger process.
Linked to innocence, was the idea of immaturity: “the better to distinguish schoolboys from adults, it were
necessary to exaggerate the puerility of their characters, even of the oldest among them.”9 The presumption
of immaturity (puerility) is the basic justification for limiting children’s rights, including compulsory
education, and denial of electoral, property, and personal rights. There is a reason to believe that
immaturity is not only greatly exaggerated, but is specifically trained, created. Consider classic experiments
of Jean Piaget. He has shown that young children’s cognition is egocentric: they cannot comprehend
conservation of volume; they believe that a taller glass has more liquid than the shorter, even though they
witness liquid transfer from a shorter but wider glass in a narrower but taller one. McGarrigle and
Donaldson have demonstrated that children may react to the expectations of the adult conducting
experiment, while they actually understand the conservation laws.10 In general, children’s immaturity may
be as much a result of social expectations as it is a result of their innate limitations.
The emergence of childhood also had all the signs of political struggle. Ariès describes in detail that until
the end of Middle Ages, student life was governed by “traditional customs of comradeship and selfgovernment.”11 Yet as early as fifteenth century, ecclesiastic and civil authorities systematically sought to
strip the student societies of self-governance. This was not met with indifference, but resulted in
spectacular, sometimes armed confrontations between students and school officials. Eventually, a new
system of discipline gradually emerged. “This system was distinguished by three principal characteristics:
constant supervision, informing raised to the level of an institution and a principle of government, and the
extended application of corporal punishment.”12 Corporal punishment, virtually unheard of till the end of
fourteenth century, has become common and brutal. Initially applied only to the youngest and the poorest
of students, by the sixteenth century, corporal punishment has become ubiquitous. In the adult world, being
subjected to corporal punishment was a marker of lower class; students of all classes suffered from
humiliating public beatings.13 “The concept of the separate nature of childhood was, of its difference from
the world of adults, began with the elementary concept of its weakness, which brought it down to the
lowest social strata.”14
In the second half of the eighteenth century, French colleges (but not English schools) have largely
abandoned both corporal punishment and the use of student informants. It was not so much a sign of
liberation, as an advent of a more militaristic model of discipline. After Napoleon I, French schools
resembled barracks more than a cloister. Ariès believes that this development indicated the birth of
adolescence. “This notion of adolescence was to bring about a major transformation of education: the
pedagogues henceforth attributed a moral value to uniform and discipline.”15 The militarization of
schooling could be viewed as replacement of compulsion mechanism. Schooling was equated with service
and sacrifice. The ethics of toughness and heroism is nothing but a labor extraction mechanism, and
ideology justifying unpaid labor. “The correlation of the adolescent and the soldier, in school, resulted in an
emphasis on characteristics such as toughness and virility which had hitherto been neglected and which
henceforth were valued for themselves.”16
“The solicitude of family, Church, moralists and administrators deprived the child of the freedom he had
hitherto enjoyed among adults. It inflicted on him the birch, the prison cell —in a word, the punishments
usually reserved for convicts from the lowest strata of society. But this severity was the expression of a
very different feeling from the old indifference: an obsessive love which was to dominate society from the
eighteenth century on.”17 Well, obsessive love is a form of domination, a particular way of channeling the
affective currents to forge dependency, and to achieve compliance. One of the ultimate tests of such
compliance is submission to schooling.
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School children as class
Ariès sees a clear connection between childhood and schooling, but does not explain the causes for the
gradual emergence of the new childhood. He claims that children have become relatively much more
important; therefore, adults paid more attention to them, and invested in their education. Ariès remains
prisoner of an assumption that education in general and schooling in particular benefits mostly its bearer, so
learning is self-enriching and self-fulfilling work. I would argue that the very notion of education as selfenriching, or as a vehicle of upward social mobility was an ideology imposed on children to ensure their
compliance with the society’s demands. In general, when someone tells me something is very good for me,
I always wonder why such a good thing needs selling.
The gradual emergence of the knowledge-intensive economy revealed one crucial bottleneck called
education. Human knowledge became remarkably easy to transmit and accumulate; machines and division
of labor has made most forms of labor infinitely more productive mostly because of the new ways of
information processing. The cost of such a transition is that now many more people need to earn to use all
this information. One crucial component of information-labor cycle has a nasty habit of dying, and taking
all its knowledge to the grave. To combat this constant leak of knowledge, we have developed a huge
industry that fills the new workers with knowledge and attitudes needed in the new economy. And learning
is still extremely time consuming, labor-intensive, and impossible to specialize; it is an archaic kind of
work characteristic of pre-industrial civilizations. By its very nature, learning is difficult, because the
results are proportional to effort, so no machine will do much good. The drudgery has been leaving fields
and factories only to reappear in schoolhouses. Such a shift has created a new social class of school-aged
students.
Vladimir Lenin has provided the best Marxist definition of class for Marx himself had not done so:
Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they
occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation
(in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their
role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of
the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.
Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another
owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social
economy.18
The definition fits well. K-12 students are a group of people who work in a specific industry, performing a
specialized form of labor. The society uses a number of legal and cultural devices to make sure students
perform the required work. They are denied basic legal rights, and are treated by a separate legal system.
The state exercises some ownership rights over the persons of children through extralegal provisions of
school authority. The school-aged children cannot own property, and are legally barred from entering the
existing free labor market (of course, for their own protection). This is to ensure that they perform only one
form of labor: school learning. They are also required by law to attend school, and their parents are
required to ensure such compliance by law. Their economic situation is similar to some other forms of nonfree labor, such as indentured servants of colonial America or bonded laborers of the British Empire.
However, children’s legal condition is more similar to chattel slavery.19 Parents act like owners whose
rights are regulated: children cannot be sold, but cannot practically be emancipated. The state also monitors
humane treatment of children (which was also common in North American slavery). The parental authority
over children more and more looks like it is delegated to parents by the state, which has an overriding
interest in ensuring large and uninterrupted supply of student labor.
The phenomenon of non-free, or bonded labor is still common throughout the world. In the developed
countries, it concentrates almost exclusively in one industry: K-12 schooling. Military conscripts, certain
prisoners present other forms of labor secured outside of wage labor market. Moreover, contemporary labor
market uses multiple ways of obtaining labor at significant discounts. Examples of such semi-free labor are
both legal and illegal immigrants, women and minorities. Yet compulsory schooling dwarfs any other
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forms of non-free labor by the number of workers employed and value produced by the industry: almost 1/5
of the American population are students.
The capitalist labor market have never been comprehensive, and always included large island of nonmarket based labor relations: the domestic labor of women, military service (both conscripted and
voluntary), modern New World slavery, serfdom and other forms of bonded labor, and volunteerism.
Although we may admire some institution on this list, and condemn others, this does not change the deep
economic affinity of these forms of labor: they all require extra-economic mechanisms, because they all are
unpaid or underpaid. In some cases, they depend on brutal force, in others—on gentle ideological coercion,
and in most—on the force of law.

Crysalization
Ariès was confused by the apparent ambivalence of the emergence of childhood through schooling: it had
all the signs of subjugation, and yet it apparently resulted in betterment for children. The medieval liberty
afforded to children is appealing if a bit shocking to us, and yet their well-organized, disciplined modern
status can be interpreted as a sign of general progress. From the very beginning, the formation of the new
subjugated class has been disguised as an act of liberation. I would argue that such a disguise is strictly
ideological, and does not alter the underlying relationship of economic exploitation. Children are another
class of bound laborers, whose work benefit the state, and by extension, the public at large to a much
greater extent than it benefits the individual. Now, the objections to my claim are obvious. What students
are required to do seems to benefit them personally. How can school-related work be interpreted as
exploitative if it so clearly benefits children themselves? After all, there is a direct link between the level of
education and life-time income. Moreover, the demand for more education is common among all classes of
our society, so even if children often do not want to learn, their parents clearly want them to attend school.
Inequalities in educational opportunity are one of the strongest grievances of the lower classes and
minorities.
A proper response to these objections would take me well beyond the limits of this paper. In essence, yes,
income raises with years of schooling, but not in a straight line, and the line does not start at zero. Rather, it
is a sharp curve. The difference in income between a high school graduate and a dropout is negligible. Just
to land at the very bottom of economic ladder, one needs at least some high school. This means that the
years of schooling almost up to high school are essentially worthless to the individual who will not
continue on. Of course, these years are far from worthless to the employers, who get literate janitors and
fast food workers without paying anything for it.
Traditional classes implied membership for life for overwhelming majority of their members. This feature
was and still is the main cause of class struggle. Yet the contemporary knowledge-based capitalism has
changed this assumption. Nothing in the notion of the class requires such vertical, along the life-span
separation. The relationships of economic domination are distributed differently now. Throughout life span,
many people now move from a dominated to dominant groups. I will call this phenomenon the
chrysalization of class. In addition to traditional classes, the population can also be sliced horizontally. For
the first few decades of human life, one has to be an economic chrysalis, compelled to perform hard and
unpaid labor. Later in life, a significant part of population will migrate into a more prosperous position;
some will also reach retirement age and won’t have to work at all. The purpose of the class division is still
the same: to extract labor. Yet the new chrysalized class structure has none of the ills of the struggle. An
individual is put into a position where she exploits her younger self.
Human life looks genuinely different from different vantage points; the diversity of ages cannot be reduced
to a strict hierarchy. What is an economic interest of a child? We often assume that it is the same as one of
the “potential adult” contained in the child. Indeed, from and adult’s point of view, working hard in school
is a great choice. However, this is hindsight wisdom. There is a logical jump here: “Because you will thank
me in the future, I can force you to do something now.” Yet your future thankfulness is a direct result of my
present use of force, so it is a case of self-fulfilling prophecy. Does the future anticipated result justify
today’s denial of rights? If yes, to what extent?
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The discussion on intergenerational justice, initiated by Rawls,20 brings forth the existence of certain ethical
obligations to people of the future and of the past.21 The problem is, we do not have relationships of
reciprocity with people who do not exist yet, and we do not know their identity (or what they would want).
While there is a strong claim in favor of inter-generational justice, it is limited, and is different from regular
justice. Following a similar logic, we must acknowledge our obligations to the “potential adult,” yet such
obligations are limited by the non-existence of such a being, and by our lack of knowledge of his or her
preferences. At the very least, we have certain obligations to actual children that are separate from our
obligations to potential adults. Our obligations to actual children must be governed by the general concepts
of justice, which excludes forced labor. Children have a right to exercise their own judgment of what
constitutes their benefit, which we may consider erroneous, but cannot deny on the basis of such a
judgment. The principle of human identity is routinely overstated. A child is the same person as an adult –
this is not an unqualified statement. They are in some respects, and not in some other respects. Therefore,
we must allow existence of different interests, including economic interests.

Emancipation
Compulsory schooling has a problem much bigger than the contemporary reformers have in mind. Longterm prospects of the mass schooling are unsustainable. Just like the New World slavery, it can co-exist
with the labor markets for a long time, but in the end, such a sector conflicts with the rest of the marketdriven economy and the democratic state. Slavery had an absolute ceiling of productivity, and it
constrained development of consumer market. In addition, the institution so clearly contradicted the
democratic ideals that it became ideologically unsustainable. Compulsory schooling represents a sector of
economy in many ways resembling American slavery. It is a large industry, thoroughly entangled in the
rest of the social matrix, and our economy dependents on it for survival. Even those few who appreciate
antidemocratic, compulsory nature of schooling, believe schooling is like holding a wolf by its ears: you
don't like it, but you don't dare let go. I suspect that we sing songs to virtues of education mostly out of
economic necessity, not out of the instinct of justice. That was exactly the rational for slavery.
Compulsory schooling has two essential, intrinsic, and unfixable problems. Economically, it relies on
highly unmotivated compulsory labor of young conscripts. School learning is remarkably inefficient, and
must remain so necessarily, because of the economic conditions in which students operate. Students
produce massive economic value, excluded from regular market mechanisms of demand and supply. But
because employers are not paying for this enormous value, they have no interest in making it more
efficient. An enormous chunk of our GDP does not enter into national statistics, because school students
perform countless hours of arduous and unpaid work. Like any other subsidized resource, cheap education
created market deformations, and encourages waste. Employers keep encouraging tougher standards and
longer duration of education, because even if school reform returns are negligible, they will still benefit by
having a bit more educated workforce.
Ideologically and politically, the position of limited rights in which we placed students is also untenable.
Despite the newest most scientific findings about the “adolescent brain,” eventual emancipation of youth is
inevitable. Moreover, school learning will have to be included in free labor market. In other words, we
would have to pay kids to study, and respect their wishes when they find a better employment. That is the
long-term prospect.
The short-term prospect is to understand the economic nature of bonded labor, and improve the conditions
of student. First, we would need to call schooling what it is—a form of national service students do for their
country, not a great gift they receive. Those who give should get recognition, tangible benefits (for
example, guaranteed health benefits tied to learning), and some voice in how schools operate. Those who
decline to serve cannot be penalized; those who are willing to learn later in life must be afforded a real
opportunity to do so. In addition to school work, schools must provide a variety of activities in which
students are willing to participate voluntarily.
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